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W
hen the current round of World Trade Organization
(WTO) talks was launched at the end of 2001,
northern governments promised to overhaul agricul-
tural trade rules—and their own farm policies.  That commitment
is at the heart of the so-called Doha “development agenda.”
Unfortunately, fine words have been followed by business as
usual.  Disagreements between the agricultural superpowers,
the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU), have
produced the familiar pattern of mutual recrimination and
deadlock at the WTO, potentially jeopardizing the entire round.
And neither protagonist shows any inclination to cut agricultur-
al subsidies at home.  The EU reform of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of June 2003 was at best a modest
step in the right direction.  
Meanwhile, developing countries have failed to develop the
alliances that might shift the terms of the debate at the WTO.
The Cairns Group (an alliance of agricultural exporting coun-
tries, 3 of which are developed and 14 of which are develop-
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What can governments in rich countries do
about poverty in poor countries, apart from
increasing and improving aid and endorsing
ambitious poverty reduction goals?  
Answer: get serious about reforming their
own farm policies and start dismantling the
agricultural trade restrictions and subsi-













1ing) is seen as a representative of large-scale commercial
exporters, African interests have been particularly neglected,
and India and China continue to wrestle below their weight
class, even though their joint engagement could fundamentally
change the WTO round. At risk of understatement, the crucial
links between agricultural trade, poverty, and food security do
not figure prominently on the WTO agenda.
All of this is bad news for global poverty reduction efforts.
More than three-quarters of the poor in the developing world—
some 900 million people—live in rural areas.  Most are small
farmers.  That is why agricultural growth based on smallholder
producers is one of the most powerful catalysts for poverty
reduction: for every additional $1 generated through agricultur-
al production, economic linkages can add another $3 to the
rural economy.  Support to agriculture in rich countries matters
because it restricts opportunities for the pro-poor rural growth
that northern governments like to endorse at international
meetings. And it matters because the rural poor cannot wait
any longer for meaningful reform.
There is a cruel irony at the heart of the current agricultural
trading system. In rich countries, agriculture represents a small
share of national income and employment, typically less than 2
percent of the total.  By contrast, agriculture accounts for 17
percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in middle-income
countries, rising to 35 percent in the poorest countries.
Agricultural exports exceed one-third of the total in almost half
of all developing countries.  Yet industrialized countries
systematically use subsidies to skew the benefits of
agricultural trade in their favor.
It does not automatically follow that northern agricultural policy
reform will create a new, more equitable pattern of
globalization.  In the absence of wider measures taken by
developing-country governments themselves to address the
underlying causes of poverty and inequality, the opportunities










2There are four priorities for developing-country policymakers.
First, developing countries have to reform their own market
and trade policies (see the accompanying essay by Eugenio
Díaz-Bonilla and Ashok Gulati).  Second, rural development
needs to figure more prominently in national budgets.  Third,
more weight has to be attached to improving poor people’s
access to education, health services, and productive assets.
Fourth, countries must provide effective institutions, through
which the poor can articulate their interests. But agricultural
trade reform in rich countries is necessary to create an
enabling environment in which pro-poor domestic reforms can
work—and it is a condition for making globalization work for
the poor.  
The fundamental problem at the heart of the WTO negotiations
is this.  Each year, rich countries spend in excess of US$300
billion in support of agriculture—some six times the amount
they allocate to foreign development assistance.  Most of the
subsidies end up supporting production and generating large
surpluses, which are then dumped on world markets at prices
that bear no relation to production costs. 
3Meanwhile, high tariffs and other trade barriers are used to
keep imports out.  Tariffs on agricultural goods in the EU and
U.S. are four to five times those applied to manufactured
goods, and peaks in excess of 100 percent—for groundnuts in
the U.S. and dairy produce in Europe, for example—are
common.  While the poorest African countries may not be able
to produce an exportable surplus of dairy products, they could
do so for beef, sugar, and cotton.  Beef and sugar, however,
are the most protected products in the EU, even more than
dairy products, and U.S. cotton policy hinders African growth.
Winners and Losers
Who benefits from these policies?  Research by Oxfam has
shown that the distribution of subsidies among farmers in both
Europe and the U.S. is more unequal than the distribution of
income in Brazil, one of the world’s most unequal countries in
terms of income.  The biggest 25 percent of EU subsidy recipi-
ents receive more than 60 percent of all subsidies.  In the U.S.
460 percent of farmers get no support at all, while the biggest 
7 percent account for 50 percent of government payments. 
The large slice of subsidies directed toward sugar and dairy
producers makes up part of this distorted picture.  To make
matters worse, most of the benefits generated through 
agricultural support do not even reach producers: the supports
are capitalized into higher land values and higher input prices.
According to OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development) estimates only 25 percent of price supports
end up as net income gain for farmers. The system results in
unfair distribution and is highly inefficient.  In the long run it
provides false signals to the incoming generation of farmers
and contributes to loss in equity for many.  Furthermore, it
contributes to disarray in world agriculture and to poverty
worldwide.
Whoever wins from the farm subsidy bonanza in rich countries,
it is the developing countries that lose in aggregate, even
though a few may gain with the EU’s “Everything but Arms”
initiative (EBA).  An IFPRI model predicts that an end to rich-
country support in agriculture would generate annual gains of
US$40 billion for developing countries, with Sub-Saharan
Africa, the world’s poorest region, gaining US$3.3 billion.  The
gains result from an increase in exports (especially for Latin
America) and import substitution effects.
Small farmers in developing countries suffer on several counts
from rich-country farm policies.  Northern production subsidies
lower prices for farm produce.  Unable to compete against
subsidized competition, the world’s poorest farmers are often
pushed out of international and even domestic markets.  The
upshot is an agricultural trading system in which success
depends less on comparative advantage than on comparative
access to subsidies.  Small farmers are efficient, innovative,
and potentially competitive, and creatively combine farming
with off-farm work.  But the world’s poorest farmers cannot
















Northern import restrictions and production subsidies help to
explain two features of the world agricultural trading system
left intact under globalization: slow growth and continued
domination by industrialized countries.  Agricultural growth in
developing countries declined to 2.2 percent per year in the
past 10 years, compared to 3.4 percent in the previous
decade. Although agricultural trade has increased in absolute
terms over the past decade, its share in total trade has
dropped to less than 10 percent.  And developing countries
account for about one-third of exports, roughly the same share
of exports as in 1980. 
The structure of agricultural protectionism in rich countries
reinforces unequal globalization.  Within the agricultural sector,
high-value-added goods represent the most dynamic growth
point.  These goods include products such as meat, fruits and
vegetables, and nuts.  Exports for this category of goods are
growing in excess of 8 percent a year—almost four times the
growth rate for the sector as a whole.  But developing coun-
tries seeking access to high-value-added markets face a
daunting array of trade barriers.
Tariff escalation, or duties that rise with each step of process-
ing, is a standard feature of industrialized-country protection-
ism.  In the EU fully processed food products face tariffs
almost twice as high as tariffs in the first stage of processing.
Latin American exporters to the EU face tariffs that are five
times higher for tomato sauces than those levied on fresh
tomatoes.  At the same time, fresh tomatoes may face prohibi-
tive tariffs in the EU during several months of the year to pro-
tect mainly Italian and Spanish producers from Latin America,
and less so from African producers, who benefit from the EU’s
ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) agree-
ment and the EBA. 
6Such practices create disincentives for investment in local pro-
cessing and deny producers in developing countries opportuni-
ties to enter higher-value-added markets, where new jobs
could be created.  Other high-value-added markets are pro-
tected by huge tariff peaks.  Developing countries (other than
ACP and EBA countries) wanting to export beef to Europe face
tariffs of up to 150 percent, while fruit and nut exporters to the
United States face tariffs of 200 percent or more.  And this is
before taking into account the arsenal of non-tariff barriers,
including phytosanitary regulations.  While the protection of
consumer health is clearly a legitimate priority, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that the selective application of health
standards is often directed toward protectionist goals.
The upshot is that many developing-country agricultural
exporters are operating in the least dynamic part of the global
economy—and they are systematically excluded from a larger
stake in higher-value-added trade.  The present pattern of
agricultural trade is thus reinforcing wider inequalities in global-
ization, with attendant implications for poverty. 
Of course, there are those who see restrictions on export
opportunities for developing-country agriculture as a blessing
in disguise.  In recent years EU ministers for agriculture and
some in the anti-globalization movement have joined hands to
warn against the perils of export agriculture, claiming that it
will displace local food production, exacerbate inequalities,
and reinforce poverty in developing countries.  Whether moti-
vated by a concern to defend indefensible farm policies or by
genuine conviction, these siren voices are wrong. The problem
is not agricultural trade per se, but the rules that govern it and
skew the benefits away from poor countries and poor farmers.
Under the right conditions, agricultural exports can act as a
dynamic force for poverty reduction, providing small farmers
with opportunities to generate income, diversify their liveli-








7Central America, small farmers have succeeded in entering
markets for high-value-added fruit and vegetable exports.  And
IFPRI research shows that export agriculture has played a criti-
cal role in reducing rural poverty in Uganda and Vietnam.  Far
from displacing food production, export success in both coun-
tries has gone hand in hand with an increase in output of basic
food staples.
None of this implies that agricultural trade generates automatic
benefits for poverty reduction.  Small farmers—especially
women—often lack access to the land, capital, information,
and marketing infrastructure needed to take advantage of
export opportunities.  In the absence of public policies in
developing countries to overcome these disadvantages—espe-
cially land tenure and credit policies—export growth can mar-
ginalize the poor.  Surely this situation calls for domestic poli-
cies that redistribute opportunities to the poor, rather than
denying the potential benefits of agricultural exports or turning
a blind eye to northern policies that restrict those benefits.
Harvesting the Cotton Subsidy
When it comes to harvesting subsidies, the U.S.’s 25,000 cot-
ton producers are first among equals.  In 2001, government
support to the sector reached about US$3.4 billion—a sum
that exceeds U.S. aid to Sub-Saharan Africa.  Most of this
support is directed toward agricultural corporations operating
capital-intensive, highly mechanized operations on vast com-
mercial estates.  Because the U.S. is the world’s largest
exporter of cotton, accounting for about 40 percent of the
world market, its domestic subsidy programs have global mar-
ket implications. According to the International Cotton Advisory
Committee, these programs artificially lowered world prices by
about one-quarter in 2001.
The losers have included desperately poor farmers in West
Africa.  This is potentially one of the world’s most productive
cotton-producing regions, thanks partly to the high quality
8associated with non-mechanized production.  Over the past
decade production has almost doubled, creating benefits for
household income, agricultural growth, and exports.  An esti-
mated 10 to 11 million people now depend on cotton produc-
tion.  For many households, cotton is the only cash crop.  It is
often grown on small farms jointly with basic food staples,
such as maize.  Not only does cotton production have a major
bearing on household food security, agricultural investment,
and rural wages, in several countries it is the largest source of
export receipts and government revenue. 
African cotton farmers do not figure prominently in debates on
U.S. farm policy.  They ought to.  Using household survey data
on income and expenditure for Benin, IFPRI has simulated the
effect of a 25 percent increase in the world price of cotton,
roughly corresponding to the effect of the elimination of U.S.
subsidies.  The estimates suggest that a price increase of 25
percent would cause the national incidence of poverty in Benin
to decline by 4 percent, enabling 250,000 people to rise above
the poverty line, which, in this context, consigns those who
live below it to hunger.
9West Africa’s experience also highlights tensions between aid
policies on the one side and agricultural trade policies on the
other.  The lower world prices induced by U.S. subsidies are
estimated to have cost the region about US$190 million in
2001, exacerbating foreign debt and balance-of-payment con-
straints.  Much has been made of the debt relief provided
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.  Yet
Burkina Faso has lost more as a direct consequence of U.S.
cotton subsidies than it receives in debt relief. And Mali’s loss-
es dwarf American aid to the country.   
The Common Agricultural
Policy
In the interest of balance, we must also acknowledge the egre-
gious role of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  The
EU likes to defend its record by pointing out that, on a per
capita basis, American farmers get more subsidies.  On the
other side of the coin, it should be pointed out that the
US$104 billion in producer support provided by Europe
accounts for one-third of the value of output, compared with
one-fifth in the United States.
10Transatlantic rivalries aside, there is no doubt that on aggre-
gate the CAP hurts poor farmers.  Take the sugar sector.  By
world standards Europe is an exceptionally high-cost producer
of sugar.  It is also the world’s largest exporter of white sugar,
accounting for 40 percent of the global market.  Under the
CAP, farmers in Europe receive a guaranteed price that is typi-
cally two to three times the world market price.  Some devel-
oping countries in the ACP group—notably Mauritius—also
benefit from this price for a fixed quota of exports under a sys-
tem of trade preferences.  Imports are kept out through tariffs
in excess of 140 percent. The high margins provided by guar-
anteed prices support levels of production far in excess of
domestic demand—hence the large exports. 
Subsidized EU exports, stimulation of domestic production,
and taxation of domestic consumption hurt non-subsidizing,
developing-country exporters, forcing countries such as
Malawi, Thailand, and Zambia out of third markets. CAP
exports also lower world sugar prices by around 15 percent. 
In 2001 Europe announced the EBA initiative, aimed at remov-
ing all import barriers for developing countries. But sugar—
along with rice and bananas—was put on the back burner. The
reason: vigorous lobbying by assorted sugar-processing and
big-farm interests. Developing countries will either have to
grow other crops or will continue to lose, as world prices for
sugar remain lower than under non-protectionist policies. The
EBA initiative is positive because it will force EU policies to
change, but the situation would be better if EU policies had
changed beforehand. 
Hopes that CAP reform would usher in a new approach to
agricultural trade by the EU were dashed by the reforms of
June 2003. The European Commission had proposed real
decoupling, aimed at reducing market-based incentives to pro-
duce. However, at the end of the process of member-state
wrangling, decoupling has been only partially introduced in
cereals, but countries can delay this until 2007. Sectors such
as sugar and dairy that account for the bulk of export subsi-
dies are either untouched or subject to only modest reforms.
11Meanwhile, overall levels of subsidy spending will probably
continue to rise until 2013. 
Implications for Food
Importers
For countries that are net food importers, standard consumer
welfare models register the lower food prices associated with
northern production subsidies and export dumping as a posi-
tive gain.  This situation raises an important policy question
that has figured prominently in debates at the WTO: namely,
would an end to export dumping by rich countries hurt food
security in developing countries?
The answer is no.  Standard consumer welfare models tend to
obscure the damage caused by agricultural dumping.  Export
subsidies in industrialized countries undermine incentives for
small farmers in developing countries, and destabilize local
markets. These subsidies raise important questions for policy-
makers in developing countries, notably with regard to import
liberalization.
In India, surges in imports of dairy products forced the govern-
ment to sharply increase tariffs at the end of the 1990s.  Some
critical voices saw the move as a retreat from free trade.  But
what does free trade mean in a context where the world’s
largest exporter of dairy produce, the EU, is providing subsi-
dies in excess of US$3 billion a year?
Under prevailing market conditions, rapid import liberalization
can inflict enormous adjustment costs on small farmers.  When
Haiti opened up its rice market in 1995, imports from the U.S.
flooded in, driving prices down by 25 percent and displacing
local farmers.  At the time agricultural subsidies to U.S. rice
producers represented 40 percent of the value of output.
Without fundamental reform of northern agricultural support
systems, import liberalization will remain a prescription for














12farmers whose livelihoods partly depend on maize production
are currently being integrated into a regional market with the
United States, whose maize farmers benefit from support 
estimated at US$9 billion a year, according to the OECD.
Given the dilapidated state of the infrastructure supporting
Mexican maize farmers, especially in rain-fed areas, the 
unbalanced competition would appear likely to reinforce rural
poverty and migration.
While developing countries may suffer from opening their mar-
kets to cheap imports, they also lose from keeping their mar-
kets closed.  IFPRI research on African markets has shown
that the indirect effects of protectionism in undermining the
very creation and growth of market institutions, including those
related to financing and banking in rural areas, have adverse
long-term consequences for development.
Among the most serious problems associated with northern
export dumping is the signal it has sent to governments in
developing countries, notably in Sub-Saharan Africa.  The
ready availability of cheap food for urban populations has 
13provided a rationale for failing to give priority to the economic
setting in which small farmers operate and for neglecting rural
infrastructure.  In fact, public investment in agriculture and
rural development had fallen off the agenda of ministries of
finance, despite the developmental payoffs.  Only recently has
it been given higher priority by donors, such as the World
Bank, once the detrimental effects of its neglect had become
clear. 
One consequence of falling agricultural investment has been
the dangerously high level of dependence on food aid and
commercial imports witnessed in many countries.  Of course,
these countries should not seek food self-sufficiency for its
own sake, but instead seek food security.  A central challenge
for these countries, and for much of Africa, is to increase
smallholder production of food, not just to reduce foreign
exchange costs, but also to generate income and employment.
Northern export subsidies make this task less attractive.
14The Way Ahead
The Doha “development round” provides a critical opportunity
to start making agricultural trade work for the poor—and
to chart a new course toward a more equitable pattern of
globalization.  Seizing that opportunity is vital, not just in the
interest of small farmers in developing countries, but also in
the interest of restoring the credibility of the rules-based multi-
lateral trading system. 
Five things need to happen to turn the pleasant words of the
Doha Declaration into action.
First, we need an honest assessment of what has happened
under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) adopted at the end
of the last round of world trade talks, the Uruguay Round.
And what has happened is not encouraging. Under the AoA
industrialized countries promised to cut agricultural support by
20 percent.  The pattern of subsidies has somewhat changed
from subsidies tied to production to those that are partly
decoupled.  The June 2003 reform of the EU CAP promises to
go further in the right direction.  Much will depend, however,
on actual implementation of the stated policies, because 
“coupled elements of payments may be maintained to avoid
abandonment of production,” as the EU deal states.
Developing-country small farmers cannot even dream of such
policy stipulations for themselves.
Broadly speaking, there has been a diminishing use of policy
instruments that reward farmers for what they produce with
price supports (defined by the WTO as “trade-distorting”).
Although there is no question that some subsidies distort trade
more than others, nominally decoupled supports often help
sustain production capacities. Producer support estimates
(PSEs), which include both types of subsidies (coupled and
decoupled), have actually increased under the AoA, as meas-








AoAHow has this been possible?  The European Union and the
United States have invented a category of support—known as
the Green Box and the Blue Box in WTO talks—deemed to be
decoupled from production and therefore exempt from cuts in
subsidies.  In effect, they have shifted their support channels
through an elaborate repackaging exercise.  Blue box meas-
ures were allowed only because the EU had lowered grain
prices by 30 percent and had instituted measures to curtail
production (set-aside).  Blue-box payments are related to land,
and to the number of cows for beef production.  Subsidies for
beef production were introduced at a time when beef prices
were lowered.  Nevertheless, this category of subsidies should
be forbidden.  These subsidies might have been justified at the
time of the price cuts in order to provide some adjustment aid.
But such adjustments are not needed for long.
Take the case of EU cereals.  Currently, wheat producers
receive a direct payment equivalent to about US$60 per metric
ton, or some 60 percent of the export price.  Under WTO rules
this payment does not count either as a production subsidy or
as an export subsidy.  The reason: it is classified as a “decou-
pled” payment because it is not coupled to current production.
This rationale might make sense to trade lawyers and account-
ants.  But food staple producers in West Africa trying to com-
pete against EU imports might take a less benign view.  It is
vital that the Doha Round deliver real decoupling and real cuts
in all support measures that create unfair competition.
Second, the Doha Round must deliver a comprehensive prohi-
bition against export support measures that act directly or indi-
rectly as export subsidies.  Farmers in developing countries
need rules that outlaw the export of agricultural goods at
prices below those received by producers.  Those rules must
extend beyond direct export subsidies to cover the full range
of measures currently in place.  These include:
• direct payments for commodities in surplus, such as EU










16• export credit programs, such as the US$5.7 billion in official-
ly supported export credit provided under the 2002 U.S.
Farm Act; and
• food aid programs used to indirectly cofinance commercial
exports.
In this round donors must make a credible commitment to ade-
quate levels of food aid, delivered in non-distorting ways, effec-
tively reaching the needy, and responding swiftly to emergencies.
Third, rich countries need to open their own markets.  As the
president of Brazil, Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva, has written:
“Any export efforts we might make will be worth nothing if the
rich countries continue to preach free trade and practice pro-
tectionism.” One of the aims of the Doha Round should be an
“early harvest” of measures to lower tariff and nontariff barriers
on agricultural goods and to eliminate tariff escalation.
Fourth, developing countries must retain the right to protect
their agricultural systems from instability and unfair competition
associated with northern agricultural subsidies.  Developing
countries themselves have put forward proposals in this area.
For example, the Government of India has advocated a “spe-
cial safeguard” provision under which higher tariffs would be
triggered if import prices fall below specified levels. 
For their part, the EU and the U.S. have resisted calls for
entrenched rights to protect food security, arguing that any
safeguards should be limited to a narrow range of “food sta-
ples” and a small group of countries.  This is a particularly
hypocritical way of thinking about food security.  Protection of
the livelihoods of small farmers cannot be reduced to a small
range of food crops. 
Fifth, while the largest benefits of agricultural liberalization
would arise from multilateral negotiations under WTO, regional
and bilateral negotiations of free trade agreements (FTAs) are













17the WTO process, but they also endanger progress at the
global level, if continued in an erratic fashion.  For the time
being, Europe and the United States should hold back on fur-
ther bilateral FTAs and fully concentrate on achieving progress
in the WTO negotiations.
These five actions will help establish a more equitable system
of international trade that is not rigged against small farmers in
developing countries.  By ending the self-serving instincts that
currently dictate their approach to agricultural trade, rich coun-
tries can help to create an enabling environment for poor farm-
ers.  Then it is up to developing-country governments them-
selves to create the conditions under which their people can
exploit trade opportunities to reduce poverty and hunger.
Under these conditions international development finance
would have a greater, more beneficial impact as well.
Kevin Watkins is head of research at Oxfam. Joachim von
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